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October 1, 2004
Volume 22, Number 10
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| Inside This Issue |
Credit Card Acceptance: What to Negotiate
Check 21 to Take Effect This Month
Long Bonds Surprise
Performance Benchmarks
Panel of Economists
Databank
Interest Rate Outlook
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Credit Card Acceptance: What to Negotiate
By Janet Langenderfer
Over the past decade, an increasing number of governments have established credit cards as an accepted form of payment for government services. When establishing or renewing contracts with credit card firms, it is important to negotiate effectively to protect the government's financial interest. This article reviews some of the key topics a government should understand and negotiate. For additional information on credit card acceptance, readers should consult GFOA's new publication, Banking Services: A Guide for Governments.
Vendor Selection. Governments interested in accepting credit cards have a variety of options regarding vendors. Qualified vendors can be found in a number of places. The financial institution where the government has its primary banking relationship is an obvious candidate to include in a vendor list. In addition, MasterCard and Visa both maintain current lists of financial institutions that offer acceptance services to governments. Discover and American Express sometimes can offer referrals as well. There are also highly qualified companies that are not general purpose banks that specialize in credit card acceptance.
Like any service involving cash management, when considering an external vendor the prudent course of action is to check references carefully. In particular, it is beneficial that the vendor has experience in card acceptance with other government agencies.
Size of Portfolio. One of the most important factors in determining the cost of credit card acceptance is the number of transactions and dollars processed over the course of a year. Like so many services, rates are variable and volume discounts are available. Therefore, by grouping different departments from a single unit of government, lower rates can be obtained. Even better, combining units of governments in a consolidated request for proposal can provide greater purchasing power. For instance, a park district, a municipality, and a county that all serve the same geographic area can have a single contract with an acquiring bank and get the benefit of their combined transaction volume. At the same time, they can keep their financial transactions and reporting separate.
When contacting potential vendors, two immediate questions arise: What is the annual volume expressed in dollars? How many transactions will be processed per year? If card acceptance is replacing cash payments, then a government cash manager would project a small percentage of payments by credit card in the first year, with the percentage growing in subsequent years as awareness of the credit card option grows. Each government will have specific circumstances that would influence actual participation rates. Regardless of the eventual participation rates and transaction volume, “break points” should be negotiated along a scale of projected volume at the time of contract negotiations.
Pricing Structure. Credit card transaction pricing is not transparent. Acquiring banks work hard to find the best compromise between passing through their costs with reasonable mark-up and providing merchants with rates that are understandable, easy to track, and easy to report. The major portion of the fees paid by a merchant are the “interchange” fees which the acquiring bank pays to the cardholder's issuing bank, as established by the system provider (e.g., MasterCard or Visa).
The interchange fee structure is designed so that every transaction is priced independently. The price is based on as many as 70 criteria, including the following four basic criteria:
- What type of card was used;
- When the transaction entered the provider's system;
- The dollar value of the transaction; and
- How the transaction entered the provider's system.
At the time a government establishes a credit card acceptance program, it is possible to estimate into which category most transactions will fit. Even so, that estimate will rarely be 100 percent accurate in application.
Furthermore, at the time an acquiring bank submits a transaction to the system provider for settlement, the interchange fee can still only be forecasted. When the system provider completes the transaction, the acquiring bank's forecasted number is used. Within another two days if the transaction did not meet all of the criteria for the forecasted interchange rate, another rate needs to be charged, so the system provider charges the acquiring bank with an adjustment for the difference in interchange fees. Obviously, all of the “days” indicated here are business days and continue regardless of calendar dates, such as the last day of a month.
Because of the complicated method of pricing transactions, it is difficult to provide accurate pricing and reporting to merchants on a timely basis. Additionally, the reporting is often difficult to present in a manner that is easy to understand. Contracts are often written in such a way that it looks like all transactions will be processed at the lowest interchange rate, but exceptions occur and higher rates can apply (often buried in contract provisions). Some vendors charge the higher rate and an additional fee for charging the higher rate; many acquiring banks do not charge an additional fee. Reading all paragraphs of a proposal and the proposed contract is very important to ensure complete understanding of all of the fees to be charged.
Bundled versus Unbundled Pricing. Is it better to pursue bundled or unbundled pricing? The answer depends in large part on the size and breadth of the program. For large programs (greater than $1 million per year), unbundled pricing makes sense. In this case, unbundled pricing means paying directly for interchange fees plus a flat per-transaction fee. Using this approach, interchange fees are passed through “at cost” (a non-negotiable cost) to the system provider (e.g., routed through the government's card processing vendor to MasterCard or Visa), and each transaction will cost a certain number of pennies each (e.g., a payment to the card processor not passed on).
For very small programs (under $100,000 per year), bundled pricing makes sense. Let the acquiring bank estimate the total overall interchange rate: the dollar amount at risk to the government is minimal and the ease of administration and oversight is greater. For either approach, the only way to determine a competitive rate is to speak to other merchants of a similar size. Whether these merchants are in the government sector or in the retail sector, it helps to get a perspective on prevailing rates.
Equipment. At the time of this writing, a single credit card terminal with a printer can be purchased for less than $750. Only your government can make the determination regarding lease/buy decisions; however, some equipment has been overpriced in the past simply because the buyer did not compare prices. Major office supply stores sell card acceptance terminals and comparing these prices to those paid by other agencies is helpful baseline information.
Service. When negotiating for credit card acceptance services, customer service is an important differentiator among firms. Several measures can be taken to gauge quality: (a) ask for customer service phone numbers; (b) determine escalation procedures when satisfaction has not been reached; (c) call the service number and talk to a representative. By doing the latter, governments may get a sense of the customer service representatives' attitude and competence and the overall quality of service that can be expected if the government establishes a relationship with the firm. Not all vendors offer extended hours (e.g., “24/7”) of customer service.
Training. Today's card acceptance equipment is relatively simple to use and most vendors provide telephone training for their customers. This training is often available whenever it is needed, not necessarily just at the time of installation. However, for large programs, there may be appropriate times to request hands-on training, particularly if there are significant issues with closing out batches at unusual times. A government would need to identify its needs and specify requirements accordingly.
Reporting. Reports and reporting formats vary widely, just as the pricing configurations do. It is advisable that governments obtain a week of sample reports. Ideally, a vendor will explain the various data fields, and demonstrate how to reconcile a week of statements. Some vendors offer online reporting down to the transaction level. Others simply offer monthly summary statements. It is important for each agency to determine its own needs.
Comparing Uncomparable Proposals. Vendors will provide bids with pricing that will be very difficult to compare. It may sound obvious, but read every item in the proposal carefully, because some of the contracts and proposals have pricing information in multiple places. Furthermore, it is not always clear how all the elements of the pricing will be implemented. The three most common methods are listed here:
1. There will be a predetermined rate for all transactions. For any transaction that does not meet the requirements for the lowest interchange rate, the cost of the additional interchange fees will be passed through to the merchant. (These transactions that do not meet the lowest rate are often called “downgraded transactions.”)
2. Each transaction will cost a predetermined amount (expressed as number of cents per transaction) and interchange fees will be passed through at cost.
3. Each transaction will be charged one of three rates: lowest, middle, and standard. The vendor would determine which interchange rates are applied to which group but does not share any of this information with the merchant. This is a very simple program for the merchant and shares the risk of interchange accuracy with the merchant. For the very large government with high transaction volume, however, there is the potential to spend more on downgraded transactions than is necessary.
If all proposals were offered in terms of interchange fees plus a transaction fee (method 2), it would be easy to compare pricing. Of course, that is not always the best pricing method for the merchant or the best vendor overall for the merchant. If the third method is offered, then interchange rates are not even offered at cost, complicating matters even further.
The best way to compare bids is to create a sample scenario and apply the proposed prices to it. For instance, a standardized method could be imposed in the request for proposal as follows:
1. Create a set of assumptions where there will be $250,000 of transactions on credit cards in a year and the average transaction will be $50. This results in 5,000 transactions per year.
2. Develop another set of assumptions about how the transactions will be processed. For example, assume that 90 percent of the transactions will be swiped through the terminal at the counter, 7 percent will be key entered (typical of payments made over the telephone), and 3 percent will go through at the highest rate in the Visa or MasterCard Systems. It is valid to ask the vendors to confirm that these are reasonable assumptions.
3. Apply the vendor's proposed bids using these assumptions and judge the results.
If competing vendors have not given enough information to complete the pricing proposal, missing information can be requested or the proposal can be considered incomplete, depending upon on each government's procurement process.
In conclusion, when negotiating a credit card acceptance agreement, governments should examine a variety of factors. Economic terms will be complex, because pricing is complex and is not always directly comparable. Customer service and other non-economic terms also will have to be assessed to round out the negotiation.
Janet Langenderfer is senior financial associate-credit cards for the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak).
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Check 21 to Take Effect This Month
The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (Check 21) will become effective on October 28, 2004. According to the Federal Reserve, the law facilitates check truncation by creating a new negotiable instrument called a substitute check. The upshot is that it will allow for greater use of electronic settlement of check payments—namely, by:
- permitting banks to truncate original checks,
- processing check information electronically, and
- delivering substitute checks to banks that want to continue receiving paper checks.
Under the new law, a substitute check is the legal equivalent of the original check and would include all the information contained on the original check. The law does not require banks to accept checks in electronic form nor does it require banks to use the new authority granted by the act to create substitute checks.
The Fed has released final Check 21 rules, including the model disclosure language for depository institutions to use in notifying consumers of their legal rights. For additional information on the regulations, refer to the following Federal Reserve Web page.
Governments will be affected in several ways. First, faster settlement may mean more rapid access to deposited fund. Secondly, in the longer term it may result in lower banking costs if banks are able to pass on electronic processing efficiencies to governments. Third, government treasury staff will need to be familiarized with substitute checks. Fourth, it may have an impact on risk management, e.g., faster notification of returned items. Conversely, it will also mean that governments issuing checks to counterparties will face fewer days of disbursement float and therefore have less time invest surplus funds. For additional information on Check 21, refer to the December 2003 edition of Public Investor, or contact Nick Greifer at 312/977-9700.
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Long Bonds Surprise
At the beginning of the year, many investors predicted general increases across the yield curve (i.e., a parallel shift). While yields have indeed increased at the short end of the yield curve, yields on longer bonds have actually declined. According to the Wall Street Journal, 10-year yields have slipped to 4.01 percent from 4.25 percent at the end of last year (and from 4.87 percent in mid-June). Just 19 percent of taxable investment-grade bond funds were beating the Lehman index's return of 3.6 percent this year (down from the 33 percent of funds that beat the index in 2003, according to fund tracker Morningstar Inc.). This may be attributable to bets taken—and lost—by bond managers who shortened durations relative to benchmark indices.
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Panel of Economists
A Bush versus Kerry Economy
Public Investor asked its panel of economists if the election of George Bush or John Kerry would likely have significantly different impacts on economic growth, inflation, and interest rates, as well as what issues the next president should concentrate on. John Silvia states that the two presidential candidates would have significantly different effects on the economy. Specifically, if Kerry is elected, likely tax increases would lower economic growth and raise inflation and interest rates. Silvia suggests that the next president reduce the growth of entitlements.
John Lonski agrees that the economy would fare differently depending on which candidate is elected. He notes that if Kerry is elected, proposed tax increases would lead to slower economic growth with lower inflation and interest rates compared to a Bush administration. He recommends that the next president focus on assuring an adequate supply of health care at a reasonable cost. This will become more of a priority given that the large baby boom generation is quickly approaching an age where it will require more health care.
Carl Tannenbaum states that the President has only a very limited ability to influence the economy. Since it is likely that neither party will dominate the next Congress, the next President will be prevented from having “carte blanche” to implement new business policies. The large deficit will also limit the next president's fiscal options. In addition, the President has virtually no control over the Federal Reserve (which has a clearer impact on economic growth, inflation, and interest rates). However, the next President will have some effect on the Fed because it will appoint Greenspan's successor.
RGM
Databank Analysis
Employment Growth Meets Expectations
The latest data once again show conflicting signals about economic expansion. The most recent Fed “Beige Book” report indicates that theeconomy continued to expand in late July and August with many districts reporting “modest” or “moderate” growth. The economy added 144,000 jobs in August, in line with expectations. In addition, the unemployment rate declined slightly to 5.4 percent. Although the economy continues to expand, high energy costs appears to be dampening economic growth.
Some economists expect that the economic expansion may moderate next year owing to less fiscal stimulus. In recent months the yield curve has been flattening—suggesting weaker future economic growth and lower future inflation. In addition, the index of leading indicators fell for the third consecutive month. However, the data may be distorted due to the recent hurricanes.
RGM
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Current
Period |
Previous
Period |
Year
Ago |
| Economic Growth |
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| Real GDP growth |
II Q '04 |
I Q '04 |
Year Ago |
| Annual rate, constant dollars |
2.8 |
4.5 |
4.1 |
Retail sales |
Aug |
Julye |
Year Ago |
| $ billions |
335.24 |
336.14 |
319.55 |
| Industrial production index |
Aug |
July |
12 mo. chg. |
| Change, monthly and annually |
0.1% |
-0.6% |
5.2% |
| Leading indicators index |
Aug |
July |
12 mo. chg. |
| Change, monthly and annually |
-0.3% |
-0.2% |
2.2% |
| New housing starts |
Aug |
July |
Year Ago |
| Thousands of units, annualized |
2,000 |
1,988 |
1,835 |
| Purchasing Management Index |
Aug |
July |
Year Ago |
| Nati'l. Assoc. of Purchasing Management |
59.0 |
62.0 |
55.0 |
Inflation |
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Consumer price index |
Aug |
July |
12 mo. chg. |
| Change, monthly and annually |
0.1% |
-0.1% |
2.7% |
Producer price index |
Aug |
July |
12 mo. chg. |
Change, monthly and annually, seasonally adjusted |
-0.1 |
0.1 |
3.4 |
| GDP price deflator |
II Q '04 |
I Q '04 |
Year Ago |
| Annual rate |
3.2 |
2.8 |
1.1 |
| Unemployment rate |
Aug |
July |
Year Ago |
| BLS |
5.4 |
5.5 |
6.1 |
| Other |
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| Money market fund maturities |
Sept 14 |
Aug 24 |
Sept '03 |
| Average portfolio maturity |
41 days |
43 days |
56 days |
| (Money Fund Report Averages TM) |
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Interest Rate Analysis
Fed Increase #3
As expected, the Fed raised the Fed funds rate 25 basis points to 1.75 percent at its September 21 meeting. This was the third consecutive increase this year. The Fed stated that, “Output growth appears to have regained some traction, and labor market conditions have improved modestly. Despite the rise in energy prices, inflation and inflation expectations have eased in recent months.”
Looking forward, the Fed suggested that it would continue its current course of “measured” rate increases to prevent inflation from flaring up. Many Fed watchers expect the Fed to raise rates gradually to a “neutral” level that neither stimulates nor dampens economic growth (it still is in a stimulative posture). The Fed funds futures market predicts that the Fed will raise rates to 2.0 percent by the end of this year, and 2.25 percent by next spring. The Fed has been gradually unwinding the excess policy accommodation that began several years ago.
RGM
| The Public Investor's panel of eminent institutional economists projects interest rates for the first day of each forecast month. Averages are the midpoints between the arithemetic mean and the median of individual projections. The low and high individual forecasts illustrate the range. |
| Rate |
November-04
Average
(Low-High) |
January-05
Average
(Low-High) |
April-05
Average
(Low-High) |
| Fed Funds |
1.8 |
2.0 |
2.5 |
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1 3/4 - 1 3/4 |
2 - 2 1/4 |
2 1/4- 2 1/2 |
| 30-day prime bank (CD) |
1.8 |
2.1 |
2.4 |
| |
1 1/4 - 1 7/8 |
1 1/2 - 2 1/8 |
2 1/4 - 2 1/2 |
| 3-month T-bill yield |
1.9 |
2.3 |
2.6 |
| |
1 3/4 - 2 1/4 |
2 1/4 - 2 3/8 |
2 1/2 - 2 3/4 |
| 5-year Treasury note |
3.6 |
3.8 |
4.1 |
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3 1/2 - 3 5/8 |
3 3/4 - 3 7/8 |
4 1/8 - 4 1/4 |
| 30-year Treasury bond |
5.1 |
5.3 |
5.4 |
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5 - 5 1/8 |
5 1/4 - 5 1/4 |
5 3/8 - 5 5/8 |
| Consensus Index* |
100% |
100% |
100% |
| *Consensus index is the percentage of responses within 75 basis points (0.75 percent) of the average interest rate. Index measures the extent of panelists' agreement. If all forecasts are with 3/4 percent of the various averages for a given month, the consensus would be 100. If all responses fall at the extreme ends of a wide range, the index is 0. |
Interest rate forecast panelists
John Lonski
John Silvia
Carl R. Tannenbaum |
Moodys Investor's Service
Wachovia Securities
LaSalle National Bank |
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Performance Benchmarks |
Public Investor Performance Indexes |
| The Public Investor 10-bill index |
| |
Quarterly/Monthly
Return
|
Annualized Returns Since |
| |
Index |
Annualized |
Jan.1, 2003 |
Jan. 1, 2002 |
| Jan. 1, 2003 |
273.6480 |
1.7% (Q) |
1.8% |
3.1% |
| Jan. 1, 2004 |
276.6328 |
1.0% (M)
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1.1% |
1.4% |
Sept. 1, 2004 |
278.3907r |
1.3% (M)r
|
1.0% |
1.3% |
| Oct. 1, 2004 |
278.6876 |
1.3% (M)
1.1% (Q) |
1.0% |
1.3% |
| The Public Investor 10-bill index consists of 10 hypothetical Treasury bill investments, with an average maturity of approximately 80 days. Every other Thursday, a T-bill matures and proceeds are reinvested alternately in the three-month and six month T-bills. This rolling index provides a benchmark for evaluating cash management portfolios with biweekly payment and payroll requirements. The original value of the index was 97.6765 on July 1, 1984. |
| The money market fund index |
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Average Return |
Jan. 1, 2003 |
Jan. 1, 2002 |
| Jan. 1, 2003 |
1.0% |
1.36% |
3.52% |
| Jan. 1, 2004 |
0.5% |
0.67% |
1.61% |
| Sept. 1, 2004 |
0.8% |
0.63% |
1.37% |
| Oct. 1, 2004 |
0.9% |
0.65% |
1.35% |
| The money market fund index is the simple average of Money Fund Report Averages (TM) seven-day money market fund indexes, as reported for the two weeks closest to the end of each month. The annualized return is calculated using these rates for a four-week period centering on the first of each month. The results should simulate returns from passive investment in an average money market fund. |
S&P Rated LGIP Index (September 17, 2004) |
7-day yield |
30-day yield |
Maturity (days) |
1.33% |
1.30% |
43 |
| This index is comprised of local government investment pools that are rated AAAm or AAm by Standard & Poor's and represents pools that strive to maintain a stable net asset value. |
| Rate |
9/24/04 |
Year Ago |
| Fed funds |
1.76 |
1.03 |
| CDs: Three months |
1.93 |
1.07 |
| CDs: Six months |
2.11 |
1.13 |
| BAs: One month |
1.78 |
1.06 |
| T-bills: 91-day yield |
1.69 |
0.94 |
| T-bills: 52-week yield |
2.16 |
1.21 |
| 2Commercial paper, dealer-placed, 3 months |
1.92 |
1.03 |
| Bond Buyer 20-bond municipal index |
4.46 |
4.81 |
| Tax-exempt notes |
1.60 |
1.09 |
| 6-Month Treasury Bill |
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| 2-Year Treasury Note |
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| 30-Year Treasury Bond |
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| Public Investor’s four-week moving averages are calculated as a simple average of Friday closing yield quotations for the most recently offered six-month Treasury bill (discount basis), two-year Treasury note, and 30-year Treasury bond. Moving averages are used by analysts to monitor trends and trend changes. Generally, interest rates are increasing (prices falling) when the moving average yield is rising and the current rate exceeds the moving average. Conversely, current yields below a declining moving average are associated with lower interest rates (high prices on fixed-income securities). Some market timers buy (or sell) longer maturities when current market yields fall below (or penetrate above) their moving averages. |
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| Executive Director/CEO |
Jeffrey Esser |
| Editor |
Nick Greifer |
| Production Editor |
Karen Utterback |
| Contributing Staff |
R. Gregory Michel, Michael Compton, David Horton |
The Public Investor is published monthly by the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA), 203 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 2700, Chicago, IL 60601. (312/977-9700; email: PublicInvestor@gfoa.org) Annual subscription rates are $55 for active GFOA members, $70 for associate GFOA members, and $85 for nonmembers. For reprint permission contact GFOA.
The information and opinions printed herein are from sources believed to be reliable, but GFOA makes no guarantee of accuracy. Opinions, forecasts and recommendations are offered by individuals and do not represent official GFOA policy positions. Nothing herein should be construed as a specific recommendation to buy or sell a financial security. |
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